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Old Fort Wingate in the Navajo War
NEIL C. MANGUM

On July 22, 1868, Fort Wingate soldiers stood in small knots and gazed
east toward the malpais landscape that rippled in undulating waves
northward toward the sluggish Rio Jose. The object of their curiositya ten-mile-long procession of Navajos snaking their way slowly through
the lava-strewn road to the post. At Fort Wingate, Indian Agent Theodore H. Dodd greeted the government-appointed tribal chiefs and assumed responsibility for the welfare of 7,000 Navajos.l Defeated,
subjugated, their independence crushed, the Navajos were returning
to their devastated homeland from an imposed exile at Bosque Redondo
in eastern New Mexico.
For Fort Wingate, situated on the fringe of the malpais at Ojo del
Gallo beneath the towering summit of Mount Taylor, the restoration
of the Navajos to their customary haunts signaled the expiration of the
post's usefulness. The garrison's birth had revolved around one purpose, and one purpose only-to serve as a base of operations to wage
an unrelenting war of attrition on the Navajos.
Other military actions, principally the campaigns that Colonel
Neil C. Mangum is Southwest Regional Historian, National Park Service, Santa Fe
and the author of Battle of the Rosebud.
1. Aurora Hunt, Major General James Henry Carleton: 1814-1873, Western Frontier Dragoon (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1958), 291-92.
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Fort Wingate and the Navajo War

Christopher Carson orchestrated from Fort Canby and the tragic Navajo experience focused at Fort Sumner, consume far more ink in historical writings. The reason for omission of Fort Wingate from
contemporary sources is that the installation did not serve as seat for
major confrontations nor share in great personal tragedy. Void of any
stirring battles or media-catching hyperbole, forces at Fort Wingate
methodically performed their assigned duties without fanfare or glitter.
The army's abandonment of Forts Defiance and Lyon in western
New Mexico in 1861 paved the way for the creation of Fort Wingate.
Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commanding the Department of New
Mexico, had withdrawn all troops at these posts for use in repelling
the Confederate invasion on the Rio Grande. This act left all of western
New Mexico void of any regular or volunteer forces.
The Navajos interpreted the troop withdrawal as evidence of their

NEIL C. MANGUM"

395

having sapped the fighting spirit of the army. Coinciding with the
receding blue line came the renewal of Indian strikes on villages, ranches,
and mines to be equaled in ferocity and brutality by attacks by New
Mexico citizens on Navajo camps. Citizen-formed raids were a centuries-old New Mexico ritual that wrought devastating havoc on the
Indians. Wholesale slaughter, destruction of homes, and enslavement
were common traits of each. 2 The violent actions of both sides reduced
New Mexico to a bubbling cauldron boiling over with hatred and
vengeance.
Canby, a veteran of the Seminole arid Mexican wars and a seasoned
veteran against southwestern Indians, possessed a kind and courteous
demeanor and harbored genuine compassion for the American Indians.
He had accurately predicted that the closure of Forts Defiance and
Lyon would resurrect vicious New Mexican and Navajo fighting.
In August, Canby formalized a campaign both to protect and punish the Navajos. New forts would be constructed in Navajo country
to supplant the defunct posts. Writing Washington on the subject,
Canby outlined a stratagem for Indian self-preservation. He perceived
a reservation system far removed from population centers of the territory as the only viable means of preventing the extermination of the
native tribes. 3 . But Colonel Canby never implemented his plan. On
September 18, 1862, Brigadier General James H. Carleton in command
of the California Volunteers replaced Canby as departmental commander. Like Canby, Carleton possessed extensive Indian experience.
Yet also autocratic, tyrannical, and sometimes a harsh disciplinarian,
he was not a man with whom to trifle. 4
In principle, Carleton endorsed Canby's reservation concept and
upheld the design for rebuilding posts in Navajoland. One of the sites
selected favored the western edge of the badlands at Ojo del Gallo..
Two considerations favored a malpais fortress. The Ojo del Gallo Valley
afforded excellent pasturage, and its position, astride two major highways-the old military road to Fort Defiance and the Spanish highway
to Zuni Pueblo-provided control and access to a primary intersection
in which to block or pursue an adversary. 5
2. Gerald Thompson, The Army and the Navajo (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1982), 8-9. The discussion of the American-Navajo difficulties is ably presented in the
chapter headed "The Navajo Problem."
'
3. Max L. Heyman, Jr., Prudent Soldier: A Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby,
1817-1873 (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1959), 159-60.
4. Robert M. Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 18481865 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 233.
5. [Albuquerque) Rio Abajo Weekly Press, June 23, 1863. The establishment of Fort
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The fort took the namesake Wingate in honor of Brevet Major
Benjamin Wingate, Fifth U.S. Infantry, who died of wounds following
the battle of Valverde, February 21, 1862. 6 In endorsing the post, Carleton cited its strategic location where soldiers could "perform services
among the Navajos as will bring them to feel that they have been doing
wrong."?
Captain Henry Selden in command of Companies D and G of the
First U.S. Cavalry, formerly the First Dragoons, initially occupied the
site. In late October, however, an aggregate of 11 officers and 317
enlisted men of the First New Mexico Cavalry Volunteers reached Fort
Wingate to initiate their long association at the isolated garrison. 8
The post's new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Francisco
Chavez, assumed command of four companies of the First New Mexico
Volunteers, Companies B, C, E, and F. 9 The majority of the officers
and enlisted personnel were of Hispanic origin. With an obviously
ethnocentric viewpoint, General Canby issued orders to keep the companies in his department segregated with the exception of the New
Mexico units. In the New Mexico companies, Canby required at least
one officer and a quarter of the noncommissioned staff to be bilingual. 10
Chavez' appointment to command at Fort Wingate was indeed
fortuitous. He ranked as one of New Mexico's favorite sons, being the
stepson of Governor Henry Connelly. Born in Bernalillo County in 1833,
Chavez attended preparatory schools in St. Louis and later spent two
years at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City. Prior
Wingate dates officially from October 22, 1862, by Special Orders No. 176, Headquarters
Department of New Mexico, September 27, 1862. Fort Wingate, New Mexico (18621914), RG 393, Records of the United States ArmyCommands, National Archives (NA).
6. William A. Keleher, ,Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868 (Santa Fe: Rydal Press,
1952), 202; L. R. Bailey, The Long Walk (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1964), 149.
7. Carleton to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas, September 22,1862, Letters Sent,
Department of New Mexico, Microfilm 1072, Roll 3, Records of the United States Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, (hereafter LS, Dept. NM, M-1072,
Roll 3, RG 393), NA. Microfilm copy in the Coronado Room, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico; Bailey, Long Walk, 149.
8. The First New Mexico Cavalry Volunteers were officially organized May 31, 1862,
following the consolidation of the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Regiments of New
Mexico Infantry. Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion, 3 vols. (New
York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 3:1366.
9. Fort Wingate Post Returns, October 1862, M-I448, RollI, RG 94, Coronado Room,
Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico; Carleton to Chavez, September 28,
1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 3, RG 393.
10. Rafael Chacon, Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth-Century New
Mexican, Jacqueline D. Meketa, ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986),
191.
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to the Civil War, he engaged in expanding the sheep industry. 11 Chavez'
first order of business at Fort Wingate, per instructions from General
Carleton, was the preparation of shelter for the sick, followed by the
construction of buildings to house stores, animals, and then the men. 12
Although construction progressed at a furious pace, the post would
never be fully completed because of incessant demands for scouting
missions against Navajos and because of the fort's poor site. Built on
top of a swampy plain with groundwater only two feet below the
surface, the fort had major structural problems. The alkaline water
extracted a heavy toll on the adobe walls, reducing them in short order
to a spongy, decaying mess. Officers complained that they spent more
time repairing than building the structures. 13
Because of the urgency for shelter, most ofthe buildings were built
in quick, shoddy fashion. Many structures were substandard or never
finished. As late as 1864 the post hospital, officers' quarters, and guardhouse were incomplete. The quartermaster storehouse had a dirt floor.
Enlisted men were still being sheltered in tents, which repeatedly collapsed in heavy winds. 14
.
Despite these problems, Colonel Chavez worked indefatigably to
construct shelter, a task made difficult with oncoming wiriter. On November 7, he wrote Captain Ben Cutler, assistant adjutant general in
Santa Fe, that a garrison work detail had nearly completed a 2,000yard irrigation ditch connecting Fort Wingate to the springs at Ojo del
Gallo. Other soldiers, Chavez wrote, were dispatched to the nearby
Zuni Mountains to fell timber for use in erecting storehouses and corrals. As a footnote Chavez added, "but I am afraid that we will not be
able to have everything under' shelter before cold weather on account
of the small amount of transportation now at this post."lS
Chavez' fears were no exaggeration. Captain Julius C. Shaw, commanding Company. F, described Fort Wingate in December 1862:
The fort looks vastly fine on paper, but as yet it has no other
11. ]. Francisco Chavez Papers, Hayden File, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson;
[Santa Fe] New Mexican, November 21, 1863.
12. Carleton to Chavez, October 12, 1862, LS, Dept. NM, M-lOn, Roll 3, RG 393.
13. Major Ethan W. Eaton to AssistantAdjutant General (AAG), April 7, 1864, Letters
Received, Department of New Mexico, Microfilms Publication M-1l73, Roll 23, Records
of the United States Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, NA (hereafter LR, Dept. NM, M-1l73, Roll 23, RG 393), Coronado Room, Zimmerman Library,
University of New Mexico; Darhs A. Miller, Soldiers and Settlers: Military Supply in the
Southwest, 1861-1885 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 226-28.
14. Miller, Soldiers and Settlers, 227.
15. Chavez to AAG, November 7, 1862, LR, Dept. NM, M-W72, Roll 25, RG 393.
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existence.... We live on, or rather exist, in holes or excavations,
made in the earth, over which our cloth tents are pitched. We are
supplied also fire places, chimneys, etc., and on the whole, during
the beautiful pleasant weather of th~ past few weeks, have enjoyed
ourselves quite well. Our camp presents more appearance of a
gypsy encampment than anything else I can compare it to. I6
To expedite construction, Chavez sent fatigue parties to cannibalize razed Fort Lyon and retrieve all salvageable materials. Unlike
most western frontier military forts, which were not surrounded by
wooden stockades, Fort Wingate was. Plans called for a stockade 4,340
feet in length and 8 feet in height. I7 More than one million feet of
lumber went into its construction. In addition to the timber, 9,317 feet
of adobe walls, 1 foot thick and 8 feet high, were required. IS Lieutenant
Allen L. Anderson, Fifth Infantry and acting engineer officer, com-mented that $45,000 in appropriations would be required to construct
the post, a cost that Washington approved. I9
Although Colonel Chavez hastened to build the post, he did not
ignore his objective-the Navajos. In an effort to differentiate friendly
Navajos from those disposed to be unfriendly, Chavez sent notices
inviting the Indians to Fort Wingate. Not surprisingly, few accepted
his invitation. 20
Meanwhile, General Carleton set into motion his Indian relocation
plan for the Navajos and Mescalero Apaches. For these two tribes, the
Bosque Redondo at Fort Sumner would become the designated collecting point and their permanent home. "The purpose I have in view,"
wrote Carleton, "is to send all captured Navajoes [sic] and Apaches to
that point [Bosque Redondo], and there to feed and take care of them
until they have opened farms and become able to support themselves,
as the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico are doing. Removal should be
the 'sine qua non' of peace." 21
By the fall of 1862, Navajos began to show concern about the
16. [San Francisco] Alta California, March 13, 1863.
17. Miller, Soldiers and Settlers, 226.
18. Herbert M. Hart, Pioneer Forts of the West (Seattle: Superior Publishing Company,
1967), 141.
19. Carleton to Brigadier General Joseph R. West, commanding District of Arizona,
LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 3, RG 393; Anderson to Carleton, November 16, 1862, LR,
Dept. NM, M-1120, Roll 15, RG 393; Miller, Soldiers and Settlers, 226.
20. Chavez to AAG, Department of New Mexico, November 7, 1862, LR, Dept.
NM, M-1072, Roll 25, RG 393:----~21. Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," New
Mexico Historical Review 12 (July 1937), 249.
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military buildup at Fort Wingate. A Navajo delegation journeyed to
Santa Fe in December to discuss a peace proposal. A stern Carleton
informed the eighteen Indians, including war chiefs Delgadito and
Barboncito, that "they could have no peace until they would give other
gurantees [sic] than their word that the peace be kept."22 Unless the
Navajos accepted peace on unconditional terms of the U.s. government, a war of attrition was imminent. The Navajos were not intimidated by white man's talk, however.
While Carleton warned the Navajos of their impending fate, Colonel Chavez stockpiled mountains of supplies at Fort Wingate for a
spring campaign. In February 1863, Chavez and the New Mexico Volunteers underwent their baptism of fire against the Navajos. An undetermined number of Navajos disrupted mundane post routines when
they breeched the corral and stole four company horses. A punitive
expedition sent after the perpetrators failed to apprehend the horse
thieves. 23 The horse stealing episode characterized the typical confrontation between soldier and Navajo during the war. At the same time
as the horse raid, Indians ambushed and killed four Hispanics and one
friendly Navajo on the CeboIIeta and Cubero road east of Fort Wingate.
The assailants escaped.
The ill-tempered Carleton fumed at <;:havez' report that outlined
the horse stealing sortie. Carleton fired a stinging reprimand to Chavez,
ordering him to seize twenty men and their families and hold them
for hostages until the horses were returned. He finished his missive,
asserting that any reaction must be carried out with a "strong firm
hand. Child's play with the Navajo must stop henceforth."24
In April General Carleton inspected Fort Wingate. He divulged to
Chavez his plans for the ultimate fate of the Navajos, including the
tran'sferral of peaceful factions to the Bosque Redondo and the hunting
down and killing of truculent parties if they resisted removal. About
May 1 at the village of Cubero, Carleton and Lieutenant Colonel Chavez
again conferred with Navajo statesmen willing to listen to the white
men. Indian dignitaries included Delgadito and Barboncito. Carleton
explained the options to the attentive warriors. It was not what they
wanted to hear. Barbondto denounced the proposal, deqaring he would
neither go to eastern New Mexico nor fight. Writing about the episode,
22. Ibid" 248.

23, Ironically, the horses were recaptured by Navajos friendly to the army and were
guided to Jemez Springs and left there for safekeeping, Chavez to AAG, March 1, 1863,
LR, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 18, RG 393.
24. Carleton to Chavez, March 6, 1863, LS, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 18, RG 393.
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Colonel Chavez quipped, "When it comes to the pinch he will fight[,]
run or go to Bosque Redondo."25
To combat the Navajos, Chavez mustered less than 300 soldiers
with only one mounted company.26 Meanwhile, as spring turned to
summer, Indian harassments near the badlands post escalated. On June
24, Navajos repeated their attack on the livestock corral, this time
capturing three head of oxen and driving off horses and mules. Chavez
directed Captain Rafael Chacon to recover the stolen stock and punish
the marauders. With twenty-two mounted men, Chacon tracked the
offenders up the old Fort Defiance Road. On June 28 he overtook the
rear guard of the Navajos. Mounting a charge, the New Mexico Volunteers scattered the surprised warriors and recaptured four horses
and a muleY
While Fort Wingate troops parried with the Navajos, General Carleton declared himself ready to take the fight to the Navajos. And the
general meant business. Messages were transmitted to Fort Wingate,
informing Colonel Chavez to reopen communications with the Navajos. Carleton admonished his subordinate to instruct the chiefs they
had until July 20 to surrender or face dire military consequences. 28 On
July 7, Barboncito, Delgadito, and Sarracino conferred with Chavez.
The colonel acquainted the chiefs with the ultimatum. Barboncito, the
spokesperson, appealed to Chavez, explaining that the chiefs desired
peace but did not wish to move to Bosque Redondo. The meeting
expired with the chiefs remaining noncommittal concerning surrender
or removal.
No one in the army hierarchy seriously entertained thoughts of
Navajo capitulation, including General Carleton at the top of the list.
Even before the July 20 deadline, he set in motion a summer campaign
to break Navajo resistance. On July 7, the aggressive Colonel Carson
left Los Pinos, situated twenty miles south of Albuquerque, with a
detachment of 750 soldiers and Indian auxilIaries. Marching rapidly,
Carson reached Fort Wingate on July 10. The fort resembled a beehive
as soldiers prepared for field service. A mountain of quartermaster
25. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico," 251; Frank McNitt, "Fort
Sumner: A Study in Origins," NroJ Mexico Historical ReviroJ 45 (July 1970), 112-13.
26. Chavez to Carleton, March 1, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-Wn, Roll 18, RG 393;
Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days, 1809-1868: "Adventures in the Path of Empire," 2 voIs.
(New York: Press of the Pioneers, 1935), 2:710.
27. Report of Captain Rafael Chacon, June 30, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-Wn, Roll
18, RG 393.
28. Keleher, Turmoil in NroJ Mexico, 303.
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supplies foretold Fort Wingate's importance as a supply depot in the
ensuing months.
Carson lingered but four days at Fort Wingate before striking out
to reestablish a fort in the heart of Navajo country. Carson converted
the blackened rubble of former F()rt Defiance into headquarters and
dubbed the new site Fort Canby. Unleashing 200 Ute scouts, Carson
sent them forward in search of their old nemeses. The Navajos managed to avoid collision with the Utes and the troops, but their peach
orchards, fields of ripening com, and their livestock fell to the despoilers. 29
While Carson's forces perfected a systematic destruction of Navajoland, Fort Wingate's soldiers planned their own punitive expedition. In an effort to harass and wear down the Navajos, scouting and
reconnaissance parties flooded the region. On July 30, 1863, Major
Edward B. Willis departed Fort Wingate with Company C, First California Volunte~rs, one of two California companies temporarily assigned to the post, and Company F, First New Mexico Cavalry. Willis'
scout, which carried him into Arizona, flushed no Indians but did serve
Carleton by forcing the Indians to move their camps.3O
In addition to forcing the Indians to scatter, the scouting expedition
illustrated how well the California and New Mexico companies would
operate in tandem. Given the prevailing attitudes of the period, the
predominantly Hispanic New Mexico Volunteers and the almost exclusively Anglo troops comprising the California column existed in
racial harmony while serving together at Fort Wingate. 31 Captain Chacon recalled in his memoirs that relations with the California troops
were always cordial. 32 Whatever their ethnic differences, the two cultures found commonality in that they were volunteers and hence were
considered inferior to regular troops. Moreover, they bonded in a common cause-a desire to hunt down and kill, if necessary, all Navajos
who did not adhere to General Carleton's Bosque Redondo plan.
In August, Captain Chacon spearheaded another grueling reconnaissance. In this effort, the New Mexicans overtook a party of Navajos
near the Salt Lakes, south of Zuni Pueblo. Chacon dispersed the Indians, killing two warriors and capturing ten women and children. On
August 28, his detachment pummeled another Navajo encampment.
29. Hunt, Major General James Henry Carleton, 276.
30. Chacon to AAG, August 11, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 18, RG 393.
31. Darlis A. Miller, The California Column in New Mexico (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1982), 5-6.
32. Canby had been critical of the New Mexico Volunteers following the battle of
Valverde, accusing them of running from the battlefield. Chacon, Legacy of Honor, 240.
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In a dawn attack, the New Mexicans scattered the village capturing
sixty women and children, 6,000 sheep, and thirty horses. 33
While Chacon chased Indians across New Mexico and Arizona,
the Navajos surreptitiously visited the malpais. On August 31, they
assailed a wagon train five miles from the post. The assault succeeded
in wounding one man and in forcing soldiers to relinquish their wagons
to the jubilant warriors. 34 Two weeks later the Indians struck again,
this time stampeding Captain Chacon's horses grazing five miles from
the post. Colonel Chavez gave pursuit but halted after an abortive
th~rty-mile chase. 35 The nettlesome assaults on Fort Wingate persisted,
serving to infuriate Carleton and to drive a wedge of discord between
him and Colonel Chavez~ Relations deteriorated in a litany of angry
messages from Carleton. 36
A proud Chavez, stung by the criticism, searched for relief from
the tyrannical Carleton. Probably using influence with his stepfather,
Governor Henry Connelly, Chavez garnered an assignment away from
Fort Wingate and the martinet Carleton. In December, he headed a
battalion of Missouri and New Mexico Volunteers escorting John Noble
Goodwin, newly appointed governor of Arizona Territory, to Fort
Whipple. 37
Meanwhile, Forts Canby and Wingate were converted into temporary detention centers for the prisoners awaiting removal to Fort
Sumner. On October 21, a contingent of warriors converged on Fort
Wingate for the purpose of demonstrating peaceful overtures. Again,
the military response to the peace proposal remained uncompromising-"All must come in and go to the Bosque Redondo, or remain in
their own country at war.,,38 In November Delgadito's destitute band
became the first major Navajo faction to' surrender wheri he and 187
33. Chacon, Legacy of Honor, 228-31; Chacon's memoirs provide excellent details for
the time he was stationed at Fort Wingate. See chapter entitled "Fort Wingate," 221-44.
34. Chavez to AAG, September 2, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 18, RG 393.
35. Chavez to Carleton, September 23, 1863, LR, Dept. NM, M-1072, Roll 18, RG
393.
36. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 487-88n.
37. The clash between General Carleton and Colonel Chavez continued and finally
destroyed their relationship, with Chavez resigning his commission. Afterwards, he
entered the political arena, serving as New Mexico's congreSSional delegate to the 40th
and 41st Congress. New Mexicans so valued his political skills that they elected him to
eight terms in New Mexico's state legislature. J. Francisco Chavez Papers, Hayden File,
Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; Bailey, Long Walk, 335.
38. L. R. Bailey, If You Take My Sheep: The Evolution and Conflicts of Navajo Pastoralism,
1630-1868 (Pasadena: Westemlore Publications, 1980), 241.
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followers traveled to Fort Wingate. Under military escort, Delgadito's
group made the long trek to Fort Sumner. 39 .
But it remained for Carleton's chief war architect, Colonel Carson,
to strike a decisive blow against the Navajos. In January 1864, Carson
took dead aim at that bastion of Navajo citadels-Canyon de Chelly.
The expedition succeeded in destroying valuable Navajo supplies.
Stunned by Carson's hammer blows, the Navajos faced two unpleasant
alternatives--surrender and become wards of the Army or retreat farther into the abyss of their vast domain and subsist off nature's meager
bounty of pinon nuts and wild potatoes. Danger impaled the latter
course. If the army did not find.them, the Utes or Puebloans might. 40
Realizing the futility of resistance, many Navajos yielded to the dictates
of the government. The r~maining Indians, their will unbent, determined to resist until the bitter end.
On February 1, 1864, 800 haIf:starved and half-frozen Navajos
congregated outside Fort Canby, awaiting transportation to Fort Sumner. The scenario duplicated itself the next day at Fort Wingate, where
a ragtag group of 680 Navajos assembled. By March 1, the ranks of
homeless Navajos mushroomed to 2,500. The Santa Fe Gazette gieefully
revealed, "There are now about 1600 Indians here, and perhaps an
equal number on their way to Fort Wingate so that [at] the rate they
arrive daily we will in less than three weeks have about five thousand
on the reservation."41
On March 4, a pitiful band of 2,000 Indians departed Fort Canby
on their "Iong walk" to Bosque Redondo. The young, the aged, and
the infirm rode in wagons, while the healthy trailed beside. Most were
ill-clad, many exhibited symptoms of malnutrition. Some succumbed
to exhaustion, but most died from dysentery attributed to poor preparation of flour. The army issued flour but failed to provide cooking
instructions. Many Navajos devoured the flour raw or mixed water
with it to form a paste or gruel; still.other Indians, poorly clad, died
en route from exposure to a chilling March cold. Their trail was easily
identified by the number of corpses that lined the road between Forts
Canby, Wingate, and Sumner. In all, 126 perished. 42
The human suffering only worsened in the succeeding weeks.
Captain Francis McCabe of the First New Mexico Cavalry Volunteers
left Fort Canby on March 20 in charge of another Navajo caravan bound
39. Thompson, The Army and the Navajo, 22.
40. Bailey, Long Walk, 161-62.
41. Ibid., 164.
42. Ibid.
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for Fort Sumner. Snowstorms pelted the column, making travel miserable. Reaching Fort Wingate, McCabe grimaced when he discerned
that headquarters had not forwarded sufficient food or blankets for hjs
pathetic captives.
The unexpected surrender of so many Indians at one time caught
General Carleton and Fort Wingate off balance and in an embarrassing
situation. Carleton instructed Fort Wingate to "place all troops on half
rations." The Indians too were placed on half rations. When another
146 hungry Navajos showed up, rations were again reduced. McCabe
finished his trek to Fort Sumner but not without tragedy and human
suffering. In his report, McCabe revealed that 110 Indians died en route
and another 25 escaped. He noted that many Indians had departed
Fort Canby without benefit of warm clothing. Blankets were not issued
until the column reached Los Pinos on the Rio Grande. 43
The demise of the haughty Navajos caused New Mexicans to rejoice enthusiastically. Governor Connelly proclaimed the first Thursday
in April as a day of prayer and thanksgiving. He honored General
Carleton and his troops for their successful campaign. Santa Fe church
bells rang gloriously in the wake of Navajo misery.
In the spring and summer of 1864, Navajos surrendered in droves.
At Fort Wingate, the new post commander Major Ethan W. Eaton spent
much of his time processing Navajos for shipment to Fort Sumner.
Vigilance, however, could not be relaxed since Manuelito's band remained defiant. Eaton maintained patrols, scouring the territory in
search of the recalcitrant warrior.
During the summer, the hard-driving Carson continued to lay
waste to the Navajo homelands. Returning to Canyon de Chelly, Carson razed the ripening orchards and fields of crops, which tightened
the strangulation hold on the Navajos. As summer turned to autumn,
more Navajos joined their relatives at Bosque Redondo. In October,
Major Eaton reported the surrender of 1,000 Navajos at Fort Wingate,
additional evidence of the effectiveness of Carson's sacking of Canyon
de Chelly and the Fort Wingate patrols.
With the advent of cold weather, Fort Wingate troops settled into
a winter routine. Garrison life focused on the mundane chores of escorting military supply wagons to and from Fort Canby, assisting in
never-ending construction activities, and tending to the needs of the
43. Report of Captain Francis McCabe to AAG, May 12, 1864, LR, Dept. NM, Selected Documents Relating to the Navajo Indians, 1864-1868, Roll 1, Records of U.s.
Army Commands, Record Group 98, NA (hereafter LR, Dept. NM, Roll 1, RG 98),
microfilm copy, New Mexico State Archives and Records Center, Santa Fe.
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Navajos who continued to dribble into the fort. But even the cold brace
of winter did not eliminate Fort Wingate troops from campaigning. On
January 2, 1865, a detachment under Lieutenant Jose Sanchez left their
creature comforts to punish sheep-stealing Indians. The column found
no Indians but did blunder into a raging snowston.n near the Datil
Mountains, which obliterated all traces of the marauders. Sanchez returned to the post empty-handed, reporting that his command subsisted for three days on nothing more than boiled wheat. Although
they did not encounter Indians, their presence forced the Navajos who
were already in a weakened condition to move their camps.44
To induce the surrender of Manuelito's band, which represented
the largest remaining contingent of Navajos opposing exodus to Bosque
Redondo, General Carleton sent three Navajos to Fort Wingate to establish contact with the proud warrior. Near Zuni they made contact
with Manuelito's camp. Despite persuasion, Manuelito remained unyielding. Although he would not go to Bosque Redondo, some of his
followers reacted differently, indicating they were tiring of war and
endless moves to avoid military patrols. The peace emissary returned
to Fort Wingate and presented their findings. They reported that about
350 Navajos remained at large. 45
During the winter, small groups of Navajos continued to migrate
to Fort Wingate. Some endeavored to establish their camp about a mile
from the post as a sign of friendliness toward the government, hoping
their actions would sway the anny to allow them to settle near the
post. When Major Eaton learned of their presence he informed them
they must go to Bosque Redondo-no exceptions, regardless of their
peaceful intentions. 46
Rather than risk the uncertainty of eastern New Mexico, the Navajos bolted, electing to take their chances on the run. After discovering
the Navajos had fled, an angry Major Eaton instructed Captain Donaciano Montoya to take twenty-five men from Companies Band F of the
First New Mexico Cavalry, who were all dismounted, and to track down
the runaways. Eaton admonished Montoya, "If they refuse to return
and resisted, to bring them in' by force .... If they fought, to kill all
he could. Women and children to be spared as much as possible."
Montoya's foot cavalry ran into a snowstorm on the trail, managing
44. Ibid,; Report of Lieutenant Jose Sanchez, January 15, 1865, to AAG LR, Dept.
NM, Roll 2, RG 98,
45, Lieutenant John Ayers to Departmental Headquarters, March 20, 1865, LR, Dept.
NM, Roll 2, RG 98,
.
46, Eaton to MG, February 13, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98,
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to overtake just two women and a child; they also killed one warrior
who lingered to rescue the family. 47
Meanwhile, the Hispanic communities of Cubero, San Mateo, and
Cebolleta, located north and east of Fort Wingate, came under repeated
assaults by Navajo bands. Predominantly poor, the villagers had accumulated large herds of sheep and other livestock, which were routinely lost to raiding Navajos who had never gone to Bosque Redondo
or to Indians returning from Bosque Redondo. Caught in the middle,
the villagers sought retribution.
In May, Antonio Mexicano and citizens of Cubero paid a visit to
Fort Wingate complaining of loss of livestock. But with so few troops
available for patrols and the lack of serviceable horses, Major Eaton
could offer little assistance. Mexicano proposed that residents of Cubero
assemble a citizen-armed force and hunt down the marauding bands
who pillaged the countryside. Generally, the military held citizen-formed
armies in low esteem because of their excess in killing and plundering,
but the new Fort Wingate commander, Lieutenant Colonel Julius Shaw,
endorsed the concept and forwarded the plan to Santa Fe. General
Carleton realized that his volunteers alone could not finish the job,
and he, too, perceived the citizen army as a means to break the Navajo
spirit.
Shortly thereafter, Mexicano's contingent joined with seventy-five
Zunis to form a formidable command. Returning to Fort Wingate May
25, Mexicano boasted a successful campaign. In less than ten days the
Cubero-Zuni column, claimed Mexicano, killed twenty-one Navajos
and captured five women in a fight nine miles from Zuni.To back his
brag, Mexicano displayed sixteen pairs of ears but did not elaborate
from what age or gender his grisly trophies originated. 48
, On the same day that Colonel Shaw learned the details of Mexicano's expedition, Navajos assaulted a timber camp just six miles from
the post, wounding one teamster. A military escort drove off the assailants. Colonel Shaw, a strong supporter of the use of civilian columns
in repelling attacks, sent a dispatch to General Carleton justifying the
employment of civilians to hunt down the Navajos.49 Shaw grumped
47. Report of Captain Donaciano Montoya to AAG, February 13, 1865, LR, Dept.
NM, RoD 2, RG 98.
48. Lieutenant Colonel Julius Shaw to AAG, May 25, 1865, LR, qept. NM, Roll 2,
RG 98; see also Shaw to AAG, November 11, 1865, LS, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
49. Shaw to AAG, May 25, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98. The timber guard
consisted of one corporal and six privates from Companies Band F, First New Mexico
Cavalry Volunteers.
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that incessant scouting missions reduced his effective force to a mere
sixty-nine privates and thirty-five serviceable horses. 50
In June, the energetic Mexicano returned to the field. On July 10,
Shaw reported to Carleton that approximately fifty Hispanics under
the direction of Mexicano attacked Manuelito's camp seventy-five miles
southwest of Fort Canby. Although Manuelito escaped, the command
captured eighteen horses plus all camp impedimenta. Pleased with
Mexicano's progress, Shaw informed Carleton that if the military would
provide ammunition and food at cost to the citizens, the communities
of Cebolleta and Acoma would place men in the field. 51
. With army endorsement, civilian raiding parties escalated. In June,
Juan Vigil led fellow Abiquiu citizens on an expedition that penetrated
Arizona. Vigil~s party fought several running engagements with the
Navajos reporting the death of nine Indians and captives numbering
eighty-five, while losing two men. His force recovered 1,000 head of
horses and sheep, which they commandered for themselves but promptly
lost to a Navajo counterattack. 52 In August Shaw announced another
nonmilitary success. Zunis collided with Navajos near that pueblo, and
in the ensuing fight, Zunis killed four and captured seven while losing
only one warrior. 53
,
Compared to the citizen expeditions, Shaw's troops remained impotent. Two August missions led by Captains Montoya and Nicholas
Hodt proved dismal. Montoya tracked Navajos toward Canyon de
Chelly but netted only four women captives. 54 Captain Hodt's scout
drifted to the southwest in search of Indians fleeing from Bosque Redondo. In a grueling march, Hodt trekked 401 miles but found no
one. 55
Despite the increased military and citizen forays, Navajo incursions persisted and intensified in the Ojo del Gallo region, probably
in retaliation for the citizen raids,. which enslaved some of their people.
In October Indians ambushed a party of soldiers providing escort for
the mail seven miles from Fort Wingate. The soldiers managed to return
safely to the fort, but citizen Manuel Martin was not as lucky. Martin

so. Shaw to AAG, June 20, 1865, LS, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98; Shaw to AAG, June
23, 1865, LS, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
.
51. Shaw to AAG, July 10, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
52. Shaw to AAG, July 24, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
53. Shaw to AAG, August 8, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
54. Report of Captain Montoya to AAG, August 22, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2,
RG 98.
55. Report of Captain Hoot to AAG, August 29, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG
98.
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fell in a rain of arrows and lead, and although severely wounded, he
held off his attackers and was brought to the fort. In conjunction with
the mail attack, Indians assaulted a civilian couple on the Cubero road,
killing the woman and wounding the man. 56
So persistent were the Navajo thrusts that Ramon Baca, justice of
the peace for the town of San Mateo, petitioned Colonel Shaw to detach
twenty to twenty-five soldiers to protect the settlement from numerous
gangs of Navajos who robbed and murdered. 57 Shaw declined, stating
he could not spare the men. He suggested that the citizens form another
private expedition to punish the Navajos, promising to provide a thousand rounds of ammunition. 58
The citizens accepted Shaw's offer and promptly elected the venerable Antonio Mexicano to head the campaign. With most of San
Mateo's eligible males away on campaign, Carleton ordered Colonel
Shaw to station troops at San Mateo to protect women and property.
Lieutenant John Feary and eleven men were detached to San Mateo
for sixty days if needed. Local citizens provided quarters for the men. 59
On March 8 Cubero citizens brought to Fort Wingate a signed
petition seeking assistance. The petition enumerated depredations
committed on the citizenry from February 1 to March 6. In that span,
Navajos stole more than 2,200 head of livestock and killed one herder
and wounded another. 60 A sympathetic Shaw simply did not have any
extra troops.
Two weeks later Carleton received a report from Fort Wingate
detailing another attack on troopers escorting the mail. This time the
expressmen were not so lucky. Three soldiers fell in the assault; a fourth
was missing butlater turned up unharmed at Cubero. 61 The new post
commander, Captain Edmund Butler of the Fifth United States Infantry,
could spare only ten men under Captain Hodt to give pursuit because
other columns were already in the field-reconnaissances to Canyon
de Chelly and Datil Mountains.
Hodt's small punitive force pressed the Indians. On the fourth
day, Hodt surprised the warriors, killing one and wounding several.
56. Shaw to AAG, October 17, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 2, RG 98.
57. Ram6n Baca to Lieutenant Colonel Shaw, November 10, 1865, LR, Dept. NM,
Roll 1, RG 98.
58. Shaw to Baca, November 12, 1865, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 1, RG 98.
59. Carleton to commanding officer Fort Wingate, LS, Dept. NM, M-I072, Roll 3,
RG 393.
60. Citizens of Cubero Petition to General Carleton, March 8, 1866, LR, Dept. NM,
Roll 2, RG 98.
.
61. Captain Edmund Butler to AAG, March 24, 1866, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98.
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Perhaps .these Indians were responsible for the expressmen killings
since Hodt found in the camp a horse belonging to one of the dead
troopers. He noted that most of the Indians appeared to be Apaches,
. not Navajos. Hodt pursued the Indians toward Sierra Blanca but turned
back because of worn-out horses. 62 Expeditions from Fort Wingate increased after the death of the expressmen but proved largely ineffective
owing to the vastness of the territory and the guerrilla-like tactics of
the Navajos and Apaches, Nevertheless, Captain Butler predicted that
if the Indians were hotly pressed, they would either "starve or surrender because of shortage of food. "63
Butler's assessment of the Navajos' plight was accurate. Military
patrols combed the region, Citizen caravans roamed the countryside,
Puebloan Indians organized war parties. And then the Utes, archenemies of the Navajos, initiated a war on the. beleaguered Navajos.
The few remaining Navajos in their shrinking domain crumbled under
the constant pressure. It was either death by starvation or acceptance
of Bosque Redondo.
On September 1, Manuelito sent word to Fort Wingate that he too
desired to lay down his arms. In company with officers, Captain Edmund Butler rode out to the Navajo camp located southwest of the
post in the direction of Agua Fria. Butler found Manuelito and twentythree of his followers. Manuelito presented himself to the cadre of
officers, his left arm dangling uselessly by his side, pierced by a bullet
in a skirmish several weeks earlier. 64 Manuelito's capitulation led to
the surrender ofthe remaining holdouts. On November 7 the redoubtable Barboncito, a defector from Bosque Redondo, turned himself in
at Fort Wingate with sixty-four of his people. By mid-December, Butler
reported to headquarters the processing and deportation of more than
550 Navajos.65 The surrender of Manuelito marked the high point of
62. Butler to AAG, March 29, 1866, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98; Butler complained'
to Carleton that even with more men, he lacked serviceable horses. Some of the men,
he confessed, resorted to riding mules.
63. Butler to AAG, May 9, 1866, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98.
64. Butler to AAG, September 2, 1866, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98. Born about
1818 at the springs that now bear his name, Manuelito emerged from the Navajo wars
as one of the principal leaders for the Navajos. In the 1870s, he became chief of the
eastern Navajos, Ganado Mucho leader of the western branch. Manuelito died at Manuelito Springs in 1893 of pneumonia, complicated by alcoholism. See Richard F. Van
Valkenburgh, "Dine Bikeyah:' in Lucy Wilcox Adams and John C. McPhee, eds., United
States Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, Navajo Service, Window Rock,
Arizona, 1941, 91; Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 501.
.
65. Butler to AAG, November 25, 1866, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98; see Butler's
letters of December 1, 11, and 15, 1866 in LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98; Keleher, Turmoil
in New Mexico, 501.
.

410

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OcrOBER 1991

Fort Wingate's service in the Navajo wars. Companies Band F of the
First New Mexico Cavalry, serving the longest stint at the post, along
with Company G, First California Volunteers, witnessed Manuelito's
surrender. A week later the volunteers were ordered to Albuquerque
for mustering out of the army.66
Indian depredations diminished but did not vanish following the
capitulation of Manuelito's and Barboncito's forces. Indeed, U.S. Regulars from Company C, Fifth U.S. Infantry and Company L, Third U.s.
Cavalry, stationed at Fort Wingate in 1867, were constantly engaged
in blocking the path of Navajos escaping from Bosque Redondo. Indian
sightings by San Mateo citizens and the report of Hispanic killings at
Cebolleta kept Captain Butler's garrison in a state of flUX. 67
While Butler endeavored to maintain a re'presentative force to deter
sporadic Navajo and Apache raids, during the summer he focused his
attention on dealing with the rapid deterioration of the fort's fabric,
which rendered the post unfit for human habitation. A Board of Officers
was convened on July 29 to examine the allegations and report recommendations. In their inspection, the board found the post "insufficient and so much out of repair as to be unfit for use." They noted
that the walls of the officers' quarters, company quarters, commissary,
and quartermaster building, hospital, and guardhouse were gradually
settling because of an inadequate foundation to support them. Moreover, they added that alkali was "eating away portions of the walls"
and that adobes used in the construction were of inferior quality. The
board recommended that the buildings be condemned as unsafe and
unfit for use. 68
Major General George Getty, Carleton's replacement as district
commander, returned the report to Captain Butler requesting his recommendations. Butler responded suggesting the post's abandonment
and reconstruction 1,500 to 2,000 yards to the southwest, away from
the alkali swamp that now inundated and infested the fort. Butler
characterized the adobe decay as so wretched that "in some places a
ramrod can be pushed through the foot of the walls." In other places,
walls so listed that orders had to be issued to tear them down. 69
66. Returns from Fort Wingate, New Mexico, Microfilm Publications 617, Roll 1448,
Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, NA (hereafter, Returns, Fort
Wingate, M-617, Roll 1448, RG 94).
67. Butler to AAG, April 28, August 16, 1867, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98.
68. Proceedings of a Board of Officers at Fort Wingate to AAG, 5.0, 83, July 28,
1867, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98.
69. Butler to AAG, August 21, 1867, LR, Dept. NM, Roll 3, RG 98; Miller, Soldiers
and Settlers, 227-28.
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Despite these reports, superiors vacillated on Fort Wingate's courseto repair or rebuild. In May 1868, General William T. Sherman, now
commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, provided some
persuasive advice. On an inspection tour, he denounced the Bosque
Redondo experiment as a failure citing "that the Navajos had sunk into
a condition of absolute poverty and despair. "70 Sherman advocated the
return of the Navajos to their homeland. In addition, he saw the need
to build posts closer to the seat of Navajo activities to better manage
their affairs. Since Fort Wingate at Ojo del Gallo was too far removed
from the Navajos, Sherman suggested that it be closed and another
post built closer to the Navajos. Military officials followed Sherman's
recommendations.
Fort Wingate was officially abandoned on July 22, 1868, the same
day that the Navajos passed under the walls of the crumbling adobe
post. 71 A new or second Fort Wingate was ordered constructed some
fifty miles west at the ruins of Fort Lyon, near present-day Gallup.
After the military abandoned the malpais garrison, nearby Hispanics
moved into the region and utilized the surplus lumber and adobe to'
build new homes. Today the largely Hispanic community of San Rafael
occupies the site of the former post.
The shadows of the Zuni Mountains and the gnarled, lava-strewn
basalt rocks of the malpais flank Fort Wingate and serve as a reminder
of the fort's rich history. Strategically situated across two major highways, the post controlled a major transporation corridor during the
Navajo campaigns. Moreover, the fort played a pivotal role in shaping
the destiny of the Navajos, serving as a staging ground-for the Navajo
war and as a deportation center for forwarding Navajos to Fort Sumner.'
From Fort Wingate countless small military reconnaissances scoured
the countryside in search of Navajos. Starving and facing a hopeless
situation, the Navajos eventually submitted to ~ life of reservation
confinement. As a result of the wholesale surrender, Fort Wingate
witnessed many of the most significant submissions of the Navajo wars,
including the surrender of Delgadito and Manuelito. Today no ruins
of Fort Wingate exist, but its significance is recalled in the dynamics
of two cultures struggling to control portions of arid New Mexico.

70, Bailey, Long Walk, 151-52.
71. Fort Wingate, N.M. (1862-1914), Records of the United States Army Commands,
Record ,Group 393, NA; Miller, Soldiers and Settlers, 227-28.
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